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Abstract
The steady increase in air traffic imposes a
need for enhanced airport capacity, and the
desire to safely reduce existing separation
minima. An important limiting factor in
establishing required separation minima is
wake vortex induced risk.
A novel probabilistic methodology is under
development for the assessment of wake
vortex induced accident risk. The
methodology is integrated within a
stochastic framework. Three probabilistic
sub models are being used:
• Wake vortex evolution model;
• Wake encounter model;
• Flight path evolution model.
This probabilistic methodology can be used
for an assessment of wake vortex safety of
different Air Traffic Management (ATM)
concepts or procedures. It provides a tool to
evaluate separation distances for the current
practice, and for promising new ATM
concepts which may enable a safe reduction
of current separation minima. Numerical
results can be fed back to ATM designers,
who can use these results to redesign or
improve their proposed ATM concept.
The safety management approach to
regulate and control wake vortex induced
risk can, and should, be based on an
assessment of accident risk probabilities,
followed by a comparison with risk criteria.
Some guidelines for the development of a
risk criteria framework, to be agreed upon
by involved interest groups, are given.
This paper outlines the probabilistic
methodology, and illustrates its initial
application for the single runway approach
under current flight regulations.
1 Introduction
With the steady increase in air traffic, there
is an urgent need to use existing and newly
proposed technologies in an efficient way.
This is reflected in the design of new high
capacity aircraft and new advanced ATM
concepts and procedures. However, it is also
recognized that safety is a key quality that
should be guaranteed. In particular the wake
vortex problem becomes more important, for
example at the busiest airports where
incidents (attributed to wake vortex
encounters) are reported by pilots, and where
there are closely spaced parallel runways
and no publicly acceptable extension
possibility.
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This requires tools and methods to enable a
quantitative assessment of wake vortex
safety. In view of the uncertainties and the
difficulties in understanding of the wake
vortex phenomena, this paper proposes a
probabilistic approach.
To support the design of new aircraft and
new advanced ATM concepts, a
probabilistic wake vortex induced risk
model has been developed. The model is
based on a stochastic framework that
incorporates the following models:
• Wake vortex evolution model;
• Wake encounter model;
• Flight path evolution model.
The model can be used to evaluate the
separation distances for the current practice,
and for promising new concepts that may
enable a safe reduction of the current
separation minima. Identified key safety
bottlenecks can be fed back to the ATM
designers, who can use these results to
redesign or improve their proposed ATM
concept.
The current separation minima stem from
the early 70’s. Although over the last 30
years they have ‘proven to be sufficiently
safe’, the current safety level is unclear and
there is a deficiency of tools and methods
to determine how to bring into account new
developments in operational usage at busy
airports.
The proposed modeling approach aims at
solving this deficiency. In order to allow
for a sufficient level of validation, this
approach is applied to conventional single
runway situation in this paper.
This paper is organized as follows. Section
2 describes some procedural aspects and
requirements relevant for the single runway
approach. Section 3 contains guidelines for
the development of a risk criteria
framework, which is the first step towards
risk based policies. In Section 4 the
probabilistic wake vortex induced accident
risk model is described. Section 5 presents
initial numerical results for the single
runway approach under current flight
regulations. The conclusions and
recommendations are given in Section 6.
2 Single runway approach
procedure and requirements
2.1 Separation minima
Provisions governing wake turbulence
separation minima are published by
International Civil Aviation Organisation
(ICAO) [18, 19, 20], and depend on the
weight classes of the involved aircraft and
the available equipment (e.g. radar or non-
radar operations).
The separation minima are based on
categories, determined by different aircraft
take off weight classes, and given in
Nautical Miles (Nm). For aircraft
approaching a single runway under radar
supported operations, the separation
minima as recommended by ICAO are
given in table 1.
Table 1   ICAO Separation minima (Nm)
L / F Heavy Medium Light
Heavy       4       5      6
Medium       -       3      4
Light       -       3      3
Wake turbulence separation minima are not
prescribed to Visual Flight Rules (VFR)
approaches, nor to Instrument Flight Rules
(IFR) on visual approach. Under these
circumstances, it is up to the pilot to
guarantee separation with other aircraft.
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2.2 Operational requirements
According to available facilities (e.g.
ground and onboard equipment), a variety
of instrument procedures have been
developed to guide the aircraft safely to the
runways during Instrument Meteorological
Conditions (IMC).In general, an instrument
procedure may have five segments: arrival,
initial, intermediate, final and missed
approach, as sketched in Figure 1.
Figure 1   Instrument approach segments
This paper only considers usage of
Instrument Landing System (ILS), the
presently most common procedure. A
detailed description of ILS procedures can
be found in the ICAO Procedures for Air
Navigation Services – Aircraft Operations
(PANS-OPS) [18].
It is clear that not only the physical
evolution of wake vortices is relevant,
human involvement is an important element
to be taken into consideration as well. Two
important actors are:
• Air Traffic Control (ATC), who is
responsible for aircraft separation,
including informing  pilots to avoid
encounters.
• Pilots, who under good visibility
conditions may envision the vortices
location, and adjust their flight path.
Some operational recommendations to
pilots to avoid wake vortices under good
visibility conditions are [20, 21]:
• Landing well beyond the preceding
larger aircraft touchdown point;
• Passing over flight path of preceding
aircraft, or at least 1000 ft under;
• Staying upwind of preceding aircraft
flight paths;
• Extra vigilance on calm days when
vortices persist longer.
Besides the above preventive measures, a
pilot can take counter control actions or
initiate a missed approach when he/she
experiences a slight roll upset, and to try to
minimize the consequences.
3 Risk based policy making
Safety assessments should be expressed in
metrics that ‘convey the risks clearly to the
decision makers, in a way that builds on the
safe foundation incorporated into the design
of the existing system and also in a form
that can be incorporated into cost/benefit
assessments’ [30]. It is proposed [24] that
‘risk characterization should be a decision-
driven activity, directed toward informing
choices and solving problems. Moreover, it
was found [22, 23] that the manner in
which risks are expressed has a major
impact on people perception of safety and
their behavior.
This stresses the importance of proper risk
characterization and consequently using
suitable and agreed upon risk metrics.
Below some initial guidelines are given for
the development of a risk criteria
framework. In addition, it is discussed how
to proceed towards risk based policies that
are agreed upon by the involved interest
groups.
3.1 Identification of risk metrics
Up to now several technical metrics have
been used in research studies to quantify the
hazard imposed by wake vortices: e.g. bank
angle, roll angle, roll rate and roll control
ratio. Unfortunately, it is not sufficiently
clear how these wake encounter type of
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metrics are related to the safety perception of
most involved interest groups (i.e. human
operators, regulatory authorities, ATM
developers, human society, passengers,
controllers). In order to improve this
situation, one should develop a probabilistic
relation between the occurrence of wake
vortex encounter severity and risk metrics
that are related to the severity of accidents,
incidents and related conditions.
For incident and accident investigation
purposes, ICAO consequence definitions
are [31, 32]:
- Accident.
- Serious incident, for an incident
involving circumstances indicating that
an accident nearly occurred.
- Non-serious incident;
- Not determined incidents.
For safety assessment purposes, Joint
Aviation Authorities (JAA) has defined
severity classes for adverse conditions [33]:
- Catastrophic condition;
- Hazardous condition;
- Major condition;
- Minor condition.
The above two classification schemes can
be combined into a classification of wake
vortex induced consequences as follows:
1. Catastrophic accident: the aircraft
encountering a wake vortex hits the
ground, resulting in loss of life;
2. Hazardous accident: the wake vortex
encounter results in one or more on-
board fatalities or serious injuries (but
no crash into the ground);
3. Major incident: the wake vortex
encounter results in one or more non-
serious injuries, but no fatality, on-board
the encountering aircraft;
4. Minor incident: the wake encounter
results in inconvenience to occupants or
an increase in crew workload.
The next step is to introduce for each of
these four classes suitable risk metrics to
regulate and control wake vortex induced
risk, such as:
- Risk event probability per movement;
- Risk event probability per year.
3.2 Safety requirements
In Speijker et al. [15, 34] initial guidelines
are developed for the assessment of safety
requirements. Two possible safety
management approaches are discussed: the
Target Level of Safety  (TLS) and the As-
Low-As-Reasonably-Practicable (ALARP)
approach. The basic idea behind these
approaches is to divide the risk continuum
into three respectively two risk judgement
regions, as sketched in Figure 2.
Figure 2   Possible risk criteria frameworks
The ALARP approach contains a tolerable
region bounded by maximally negligible and
minimally unacceptable levels of risk.
Within the tolerable region the risk must be
proven to be As Low As Reasonably
Practicable (ALARP) in order to be
acceptable [8, 9]. Cost-Benefit Analysis
(CBA) is a method that can be used to
demonstrate that any further risk reduction
in the tolerable region is impracticable.
Recently the development of the ALARP
approach for use in aviation risk
management has been investigated within
the context of Reduced Vertical Separation
Minima (RVSM) in European Civil
Aviation Conference (ECAC) countries [8].
It was argued that a combination of these
two safety management approaches might
be beneficial to aviation risk management
under certain conditions.
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3.3 Towards risk based policies
The ICAO separation minima shown in
Table 1 form a good example of the current
prescriptive approach towards safety
management in civil aviation. In two recent
studies [35, 36] this problem and directions
for improvement have been studied. In a
study of the Radio Technical Commission
for Aeronautics (RTCA) [35] emphasis was
on developing improvements within the
existing prescriptive approach towards
safety. The resulting recommendations are
largely addressing the issues to be
addressed by authorities in order to
improve the situation. In Blom and Nijhuis
[36] the emphasis was on what could be
learned by all parties concerned from
experiences in other safety critical
industries. A key learning example came
from the offshore petrochemical industry.
Safety policy was there based on a
prescriptive approach. However, in reaction
to the Piper-Alpha catastrophe in the North
Sea in 1988, a major change in safety
policy has been developed and introduced
in the United Kingdom. The key change is
the introduction of a goal-setting safety
management approach (see Figure 3).
The basic idea is that safety monitoring and
feedback to all management levels in an
organization becomes standard practice,
and that top management has the
responsibility to agree with the authorities
with respect to the safety goals and the
safety monitoring and feedback
mechanisms. Most remarkably, top
management in offshore industry has
become an active promoter of such goal-
setting safety management approach.
For wake vortices the adoption of a goal-
setting safety management approach would
give service providers the possibility to
develop and optimize operations that
account for technological developments
Figure 3 Goal-setting safety management
and the local conditions of a particular
airport (airport layout, meteorological
conditions, equipment level, etc.) without
the need to await authority initiatives. One
of the important feedback tools is to start
the building of modern safety cases for a
new operation under development in
collaboration with other stakeholders [37].
The key stakeholders to collaborate with
are the major airport users, the airport
service provider and the manufacturers of
ground/airborne equipment and aircraft.
4 Safety assessment model
4.1 Risk assessment methodology
As the basis for the development of the
WAke Vortex Induced Risk assessment
(WAVIR) methodology use is made of the
TOPAZ (Traffic Organization and
Perturbation AnalyZer) methodology to
assess accident risks for advanced ATM
operations [7]. TOPAZ supports a spiral
development cycle that is of the form:
A. Design of an ATM operational concept.
B. Assessment of the ATM concept,
resulting in a cost-benefit overview.
C. Detailed analysis of the assessment
results, resulting in recommendations to
improve the ATM concept.
D. Review ATM concept development
strategy and plan.
E. Back to A: adapted and/or more detailed
ATM concept design using the results
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from C resulting in a new or optimised
ATM concept.
The TOPAZ methodology is based on a
stochastic modelling approach towards risk
assessment and has been developed to
provide designers of advanced ATM with
safety feedback following on a (re)design
cycle, see Figure 4.
Figure 4   TOPAZ risk assessment cycle
During the assessment cycle four stages are
sequentially conducted:
1. Identification of operation and hazards
(upper box in Figure 4)
2. Mathematical modelling (lower right
box in Figure 4)
3. Accident risk assessment (middle box
in Figure 4)
4. Feedback to operational experts (lower
left box in Figure 4)
For the second and third stages use can be
made of different TOPAZ tool sets. For the
assessment of wake vortex induced risk, the
WAVIR and SIMULATOR tool sets are
used.
4.2 Overview of the risk model
To determine the metrics for the possible
wake vortex induced risk events, an
appropriate safety assessment model is
required. In view of the uncertainties and
the difficulties in understanding of the
wake vortex phenomena, it is proposed to
follow a probabilistic approach.
This probabilistic model should enable
evaluation of wake vortex safety under
various operational and weather conditions.
It should also be possible to evaluate the
current practice as well as promising new
concepts, such as new operational
improvements, aerodynamic aircraft
designs, or weather related separation
minima. The approach should be able to
cover the situation of a sequence of aircraft
that fly towards different kinds of runway
configurations.
Considering these requirements, three
probabilistic sub models are integrated
within a stochastic framework:
• Wake vortex evolution model
• Wake encounter model
• Flight path evolution model
An extensive literature survey [10] led to
the selection of the deterministic wake
vortex related sub models described in
Section 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6. These models are
probabilitised in three steps [15], and
integrated in a stochastic framework [6].
Figure 5 below gives an overview of the
main elements of the probabilistic safety
assessment.
Figure 5   Overview probabilistic approach
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4.3 Wake vortex risk assessment
To numerically assess wake vortex induced
accident risk the models mentioned in
Section 4.1 are integrated. The assessment
is carried out in a seven-step procedure.
Step 1: The parameters in the wake vortex
evolution model are identified and the
parameter distributions are based on
empirical data and/or state-of-the-art
literature. In addition a set of relevant
longitudinal positions x is determined.
Step 2: Run Monte Carlo simulations with
the wake vortex evolution model for the
case that the wake vortex is generated when
the leading aircraft has longitudinal
position x. The position, strength, and core
radius of the wake vortex are obtained at
the time instant that it has the same
longitudinal co-ordinate as the trailer
aircraft. The latter time instant follows from
Monte Carlo simulations with the
SIMULATOR tool.
Step 3: The simulation results from Step 2
are analysed. Based on this analysis a
dedicated probability density fitting
procedure is identified that accounts for
dependencies between the position co-
ordinates, the strength, and the core radius
of the wake vortex. The probability density
fitting procedure is carried out and the joint
distribution of the wake vortex position,
strength, and core radius is obtained.
Step 4: Monte Carlo simulations are carried
out to simulate the wake vortex encounter.
In this step the joint distribution from Step
3 is used and distributions of the position of
the trailer aircraft obtained with the
SIMULATOR tool set are used.
Step 5 concerns the numerical evaluation of
the wake induced accident risk due to a
wake vortex that is generated when the
leading aircraft was at position x.
Step 6: The wake induced accident risk is
obtained by maximising over x the risk
obtained in Step 5.
Step 7: Perform a qualitative uncertainty
analysis of the influence of modelling
assumptions on estimated accident risk.
4.4 Flight path evolution model
The flight path evolution model yields the
following stochastic variables:
• The lateral and vertical co-ordinates of
the leader if its longitudinal co-ordinate
x is given,
• The period of time elapsed between the
generation of the wake and the time
instant that the trailer has longitudinal
position x,
• The lateral and vertical co-ordinates of
the trailer when it has longitudinal co-
ordinate x.
The flight path evolution model is a
stochastic dynamical model, which
incorporates the established ICAO
Collision Risk Manual (CRM) [5] as
baseline, and which has been further
developed to handle the dependent usage of
closely spaced runways [11]. This model is
represented in a form [14] that allows a
straightforward extension of the
SIMULATOR tool set for new air and/or
ground procedures and advanced vortex
detection and decision-support systems.
4.5 Wake vortex evolution model
This section provides a mathematical
description of the wake vortex evolution
model, which accounts for stratification,
atmospheric turbulence, ground effects
(rebound, divergence) and crosswind
(advection, shear) [1, 2,12]. It is extended
with probabilistic wind field models to
include the impact of wind in the vertical
and lateral direction [6, 15, 29].
The model enables determination of the
wake vortices motion, decay and strength in
time at certain positions relative to the
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leader. This aircraft generates two counter
rotating vortices of which the positions and
strengths are to be determined. The positions
are given relative to a rectangular xyz-
coordinate system, with x-axis in
longitudinal direction, y-axis in lateral
direction and z-axis in the vertical direction.
The positions of the left and right centers of
two vortices, are represented by
},,{ −−−− = tttt zyxX  and },,{
++++
= tttt zyxX .The
strengths of the vortices are denoted by
ℜ∈Γ−t  and  ℜ∈Γ+t . The initial positions at
time t=0 are denoted by −
0X  and 
+
0X , and are
determined by the three dimensional
position of the center of the leader aircraft at
time t=0. The initial strengths are denoted by
−Γ0  and 
+Γ0 .
4.5.1 Wake vortex strength and decay
The basic equation of wake vortex decay is
that the rate of change of circulation strength
equals the sum of the rates of change of
circulation due to viscosity, buoyancy,
turbulence, and crosswind:
crosswturbbuoyvisc
dt
d
dt
d
dt
d
dt
d
dt
d ±±±±± Γ
+
Γ
+
Γ
+
Γ
=
Γ
The rate of change for viscosity depends on
vortex descent speed, viscous force
coefficient (CD), wake oval width (Lwv),
angle between force and drift velocity of a
vortex (ht), and the initial spacing between
the vortices (b0), and is equal to
0
2
cos
2
cos
b
LCX
dt
d twvDt
ityvis
±±±
=
Γ θ&
The rate of change for buoyancy force
depends on the area of the wake oval (Awv),
the Brunt–V#is#l# frequency (N), the
descent distance of a vortex, the angle
between the force and drift velocity of a
vortex (ht), and the initial spacing between
the two vortices (b0), and is given by:
[ ]
0
0
2 cos
b
zzNA
dt
d ttwv
buoyancy
±±±±
−
=
Γ θ
The rate of change for atmospheric
turbulence depends on the rms turbulence
velocity (q), the vortex circulation (#t), and
the initial spacing between the vortices (b0),
and is given by:
0
82.0
b
q
dt
d t
turbulence
±± Γ
−=
Γ
An effect of crosswind is the acceleration
of the decay of the vortex with the opposite
sign vorticity from the crosswind. The
decay rate of the other vortex is not
influenced significantly. This effect can be
modeled by adding a term in the basic
equation of wake vortex decay:
003
2
bwC
dt
d
DV
crossw
σ−=
Γ+   and  0=Γ
−
crossw
dt
d
with CDV the viscous coefficient caused by
crosswind, r the wind shear coefficient, and
w0 the crosswind magnitude at initial height
z0
+.
The initial value of the circulation at t=0
depends on the weight of the leader (Wi),
the initial aircraft true airspeed, the initial
spacing between the vortices (b0) and the
density (#) [13]:
][ 0,00
0
x
i
i
xb
W
ωρ −
=Γ±
&
The vortex residence time depends on two
influencing phenomena: Crow instability
and vortex bursting. An analytical model
has been proposed that assumes bursting
and linking to happen in time as a function
of some meteorological parameters [1].
To better account for observed data, in
WAVIR the probabilistic bursting and
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linking period is modelled independently of
the vortex evolution and decay as a
stochastic variable with a Rayleigh density,
the mean of which is assumed equal to 50s.
This density is depicted in Figure 6 together
with empirical data for vortex residence
period. It is assumed that the curve is
independent of height, and is also valid at
higher altitudes. This Rayleigh density
modelling differs significantly from the
theoretical probability density model of
Kuzmin [3].
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Figure 6 Solid line: observed residence
time distribution for B-747 vortices with
initial height 30 metres, initial strength of
the wake of 600 m2/s and wingspan 60
metres [17]. Dashed line: Rayleigh density
adopted in WAVIR for vortex bursting or
linking time
4.5.2 Wake vortex position
In order to determine the wake vortex
induced rolling moment on an encountering
aircraft j, the trajectories of the counter-
rotating wake vortices are also required.
Basic equations for these trajectories are
provided by Corjon and Poinsot [1],
thereby accounting for divergence and
rebound effects. The model gives equations
for the total induced velocity of primary
and secondary vortices. These equations are
modified to include the wind speed # in all
three directions. The equations from which
the trajectories of the two counter-rotating
vortices can be evaluated are given by:
x
i
dt
dx
ω=
''
''
2 2
cos
2
i
ii
ij
ij
ij
j
y
i
rr
zz
dt
dy
π
θ
π
ω
Γ
+
−Γ
+= ∑
≠
''
''
2 2
sin
2
i
ii
ij
ij
ij
j
z
i
rr
yy
dt
dz
π
θ
π
ω
Γ
+
−Γ
+= ∑
≠
2''
''
][2 i
iii
rdt
d
π
θ Γ−Γ
=
( ) ( )222 ijijij zzyyr −+−=
where i=1,2 and j=1,..,4. An explanation of
the terms in the equations and the
dimensions of the involved parameters can
be found in references [1], [2].
Of course, the wind field model has to be
tuned for the airport situation. This can be
done on the basis of statistical measurement
based data.
4.6 Wake encounter model
This section provides a description of the
used wake encounter model, consisting of
two parts:
• A wake vortex interaction model;
• An aircraft control capability model.
The wake encounter model yields the
probability that the wake vortex induced
rolling moment is larger than the maximum
control capability – in terms of rolling
control moment – of the encountering
aircraft.
4.6.1 Wake vortex interaction model
The wake vortex interaction model is based
on Kuzmin [3]. The description of the
deterministic version that has been
probabilitised is given below.
The aircraft encountering the vortex alters,
to some extent, the wake vortex flow field
as generated by the leader. In general, one
effect is to reduce the rolling moment as
calculated with the wake vortex evolution
model.
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The vortex-induced rolling moment on the
encountering aircraft j is modeled as a
function of vortex strength and the distance
between aircraft axis and vortex axis. The
non-dimensionalised rolling moment is
estimated for the situation with vortex axis
parallel to the aircraft axis with the
assumption of a rectangular wing, and is
given by:
)~,~(
2
)( zdydF
bV
C
tM
jj
t
j
tj
induced
π
±Γ
=
The vortex-induced rolling moment
depends on the flight speed of the
encountering aircraft (Vt
j), its wing span
(bj), the vortex strength (#t), the aircraft
specific coefficient Cj , and a function F.
This function F, describing the influence of
the distance between vortex axis and
aircraft axis, is:
( )
( )





 +
+

 −
−



++
−+
+=
yd
zd
yd
zd
yd
zdyd
zdydzd
zdydF
~
~2/1
arctan~
~2/1
arctan~
~2/1~
~2/1~
ln
2
~
1)~,~(
22
22
where the required input values of F depend
on the distance between vortex axis and
aircraft axis in lateral and vertical direction
(dy and dz), the vortex core radius (rcore)
and the wing span (bj) of the encountering
aircraft j, according to:
j
core
b
dyr
yd
22
~ +
=
jb
dz
zd =~
For vortex core radius growth in time of
vortices that did not have changed state by
bursting or linking the following equation
is used:
)0125.0,max()( 0, trtr otcorecore Γ= =
Note that the vortex-induced rolling
moment attains its maximum at distance
equal to the vortex core radius from the
vortex axis. This indicates that the majority
of angular momentum is in the regions
farthest from the core. Outside the core
radius, the rolling moment is negligible.
4.6.2 Control capability model
The aircraft control capability model is
based on Kuzmin [3] and Woodfield [4].
The deterministic version that has been
probabilitised is described below.
The basic equation for the maximum roll
control moment of an aircraft j depends on
the wing span (bj), the wing area (Sj), the
air density (#), the aircraft true airspeed
(
tx
j
tx ,ω−& ), the maximum steady roll rate ( pˆ ),
and the roll damping coefficient ( j
rdC ), and
is given by:
[ ] pCxbStM jrdtxjtjjjcontrol ˆ4 ][)( ,
2
ωρ −−= &
The equation for the maximum steady roll
rate depends on encounter time (tenc), bank
angle (v(tenc)) and roll mode time constant
(t), and is:
)1(
)(
ˆ
ττ
φ
enct
enc
enc
et
t
p
−
−−
=
A method for estimating pˆ  can be based on
the minimum control capability
requirements of aircraft rolling a certain
bank angle within a certain period of time
[3, 4]. Assuming that an aircraft performs
two times better than such a requirement,
and using the fact that the roll mode time
constant is usually around 1 sec., pˆ  can
easily be estimated.
The equation for the roll damping
coefficient depends on the local lift curve
slope of the wing (aj) and the ratio between
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local wing chord (cj) and standard mean
chord ( c j), and is given by:
∫∫ ′′−=−=
2/1
0
2
22/1
0
44 ydy
c
c
a
b
y
d
b
y
c
c
aC
j
j
j
jjj
j
jj
rd
The roll damping coefficient clearly
depends on the shape of an aircraft wing,
thus reflecting the aircraft design in the
developed risk model. To estimate this
coefficient, some assumptions must be
made regarding the shape of the aircraft
wing.
5 Numerical evaluations
To illustrate the wake vortex induced
accident risk assessment methodology a
(single) runway is considered, on which a
Boeing 737-400 aircraft, which is in the
ICAO medium weight class, is landing
behind a  Boeing 747-400 aircraft, which is
in the ICAO heavy weight class.
Three different scenarios, with controller
expected separation distance of 4 Nm, 5
Nm, and 6 Nm when the heavy is at the
threshold, are being considered. For both
involved aircraft it is assumed that the
approach is ILS Cat I, with Decision Height
(DH) equal to 200 ft.
5.1 Modeling assumptions
The landing phase starts at about 20 km
before the threshold, and ends at
touchdown, which is 300 metres beyond
threshold. Figure 6 shows the side view of
the runway and glide slope, where the x-
axis is along the runway centerline and
positive in runway direction.
x = 0 m  
THR 
x = -20 km  x = 300 m  
Touchdown
ILS path  
Runway  
ILS intercept
    
      
3     
o 
Fig.7 Side view of runway and glide slope
The novel wake induced risk assessment
methodology clearly allows to bring the
assumptions made to the foreground. For
this example, the following main
assumptions have been adopted:
A.1 Long landings (landings far beyond
threshold) do not happen.
A.2 A wake vortex induced accident is
characterised by the wake induced
rolling moment being larger than the
aircraft control capability. The latter
is assumed to be equal to two times
the aircraft certification requirement.
A.3 A pilot does not initiate a missed
approach when experiencing a slight
roll upset.
A.4 Bursting and linking probabilities are
modelled by a Rayleigh density with
mean 50 seconds.
A.5 There is no head wind, no tail wind
and no vertical wind. The wind speed
in lateral direction is normally
distributed with expectation 0 and
standard deviation 1.5 m/s.
A.6 There are no wind shear layers.
A.7 Turbulence of the air is 10% of the
wind speed.
In addition to these main assumptions,
several other assumptions have been made.
It would go beyond the scope of this paper
to list all these assumptions.
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5.2 Numerical results
With support of the toolsets WAVIR and
SIMULATOR, the wake vortex induced
risk is evaluated for the single runway
approach. Monte Carlo simulations are
performed for six cases, where the wake
vortices are generated when the leader has
distance 0, 400, 2000, 4000, 7000, and
17147 m from threshold. The latter is
associated with a height of 3000 ft.
Below some plots are presented for the case
associated with the controller expected
separation distance of 5 Nm at the
threshold. Similar data plots associated
with the cases 4 Nm and 6 Nm are not
included in this paper. Figures 8e, 8d, 8c,
8a show histograms with the lateral and
vertical position, strength, and radius of the
left vortex for wake vortices generated at
17147, 7000, 2000 and 0 m from the
threshold.
−1000 −800 −600 −400 −200 0 200 400 600 800
0
10
20
yl
Configuration exp5e: Histograms at s= all
600 650 700 750 800 850 900 950 1000 1050 1100
0
10
20
30
zl
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
0
5
10
15
gammal
2.6 2.65 2.7 2.75 2.8 2.85 2.9 2.95 3 3.05 3.1
0
10
20
radiusl
Fig. 8e – 5 Nm Histograms, at x=17147 m
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Figure 8d – 5 Nm Histograms, at x=7000 m
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Figure 8c – 5 Nm Histograms, at x=2000 m
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Figure 8a – 5 Nm Histograms, at threshold
The decrease in uncertainty about the
position is for some part determined by the
increase in navigation performance along
the glide path. The navigation performance
of the leader is based on the ICAO-CRM
[5], and is incorporated in these figures.
With increased navigation performance, the
uncertainty about the wake vortex position
will decrease. Note the impact of ground
effect in Figure 8a.
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Fig. 9e – Position data plot, at x=17147 m
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Figure 9d – Position data plot, at x=7000 m
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Figure 9c – Position data plot, at x=2000 m
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Figure 9a – Position data plot, at threshold
Figures 9e, 9d, 9c, 9a show the lateral
position versus the height of the left vortex
for the case associated with 5 Nm
separation.
Figure 10 shows the instantaneous risk
resulting from a wake that is generated at –
x km before the threshold.
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Figure 10 Instantaneous wake vortex
induced risk along the glide slope. The
vertical axis has a logarithmic scale.
Figure 10 shows that the instantaneous risk
decreases from 20 km till about 4 km
before the threshold. The decrease is due to
the higher navigation precision of the trailer
and leader by which the chances of flying
such low to encounter a wake is reduced.
At shorter distance from the threshold the
instantaneous risk increases due to the
rebound of wakes near the ground.
Figure 11 shows the wake vortex induced
accident risk versus controller expected
separation distance, when the heavy is at
the threshold.
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Figure 11 Accident risk versus separation.
The vertical axis has a logarithmic scale.
Note that the risk decreases far more
rapidly when the separation distance
increases from 5 Nm to 6 Nm than from 4
Nm to 5 Nm.
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5.3 Uncertainty analysis
A straightforward maximisation over x for
the risk curves in Figure 9 leads to an
overall maximum risk at the threshold.
However, one should bring into account
that the calculated wake vortex induced
accident risk curve may bear significant
bias and/or uncertainty both in positive and
negative directions. Usage of such a curve
without taking into consideration existing
bias and/or uncertainty can inspire undue
conclusions.
In order to understand the impact of the
assumptions on the wake vortex induced
risk, A.1-A.7 have been analysed in a
qualitative way. The results are given in
Table 2, where an optimistic expected
direction means that the modelled risk
reduces due to the assumption.
The effect of other assumptions on the
wake induced accident risk has been
estimated as either minor or negligible.
Table 2 Effect of the main assumptions on
the assessed risk
A.#
Expected direction of
effect on wake vortex
induced accident risk
Expected
magnitude
A.1 Optimistic Significant
A.2 Neutral Significant
A.3 Pessimistic Major
A.4 Neutral Significant
A.5 Optimistic Significant
A.6 Optimistic Major
A.7 Pessimistic Significant
A similar reasoning as given in Kos et
al.[29], shows that the very right and left
part of the curve in Figure 9 have a major
level of uncertainty with a clear bias in the
pessimistic direction and optimistic
direction respectively.
5.4 Discussion of the results
It has been shown that there are two areas
along the approach where the risk can be
considerable:
• Near the threshold, due to the ground
effect on the wake evolution;
• At distances larger than 10 km from
threshold, due to larger navigation
errors further away from the runway.
This result is consistent with statistical
analysis of data from the European
Turbulent Wake Incident Reporting Log
(ETWIRL wake encounter database, see
Figure 12 [28].
Figure 12 Histogram of encounter altitude
However, the absolute value of the wake
vortex induced risk depends largely on
separation distance. The risk decreases far
more rapidly when the separation distance
increases from 5 Nm to 6 Nm than from 4
Nm to 5 Nm.
The Rayleigh density for bursting and
linking probability is to some significant
extent responsible for decrease of the
accident risk as separation distance
increases. This implies that modeling the
wake vortex residence time with
appropriate and validated probability
distributions is of major importance for
wake vortex safety assessment. In
particular, predictions of wake vortex
residence times under different weather
conditions should enable a more detailed
analysis of the impact of weather on risk.
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5.5 Influence of wind conditions
In the above, numerical evaluations have
been carried out for the situation with no
head wind, no tail wind and no vertical
wind. Of course, although the results
illustrate the methodology under
development, in reality for most airports the
wind conditions are more diverse. In the
following the effect of wind on the wake
vortex induced risk is discussed.
The horizontal wind model accounts for
height dependency. It appeared that
horizontal wind can have a major impact on
the wake vortex induced risks. Head wind
enlarges the effective vertical distance
between the trailer and the wake vortex that
has been generated by the leader, whereas
tail wind effectively reduces this distance.
Therefore, the risks that are evaluated with
the WAVIR model are often higher for the
case of tail wind than for the case of head
wind. This corresponds to pilot experience.
Detailed numbers depend on the ATM
procedures at the airport (e.g. procedures
for tail wind landings) and on the horizontal
wind field. Strong crosswind may transport
the wake vortex so that it is laterally far
from the trailer, which reduces the wake
vortex induced risks.
The vertical wind field model accounts for
varying weather conditions. The strongest
vertical wind speeds occur in case of a
convective atmosphere. In this case, wakes
can travel significant distances. In addition,
the left wake can be in an upwind, whereas
the right wake is in a downwind. Hence the
distance between the left and right wake
can become so large that they may be
considered as isolated wakes. In a
convective atmosphere there may be
isolated wakes that stay at the height at
which they have been generated (or they
may rise). Since the wake vortex induced
risks are mainly due to wakes generated at
low altitude (near the threshold), the
vertical wind is considered to be of minor
importance for wake vortex induced risk.
5.6 Influence of weather
It is important to realize the major influence
of specific weather conditions, in particular
wind fields, turbulence, stable stratification
and wind shear [16].
Generally vortex decay is enhanced in an
ambient turbulence environment. Under
stable stratification conditions, vortices will
decay but may stall or rise. Wind shear,
with weak turbulence and weak stable
stratification may enhance stalling or rising
vortices without significant decay. It was
shown that vortices may stall or rebound to
the glide path in the convective, stable
stratified and sheared boundary layer [28].
Important from a safety point of view is
that rising vortices have been observed at
higher altitudes that cannot be explained by
rebound and ground effect [25]. Interesting
is also that vortices seem unaffected by
uniform fog or rain [27].
Recent research focuses on the
development of ATM concepts that may
enable reduction of separation minima
under certain weather conditions, so as to
increase capacity. Examples are the High
Approach Landing System (HALS)
procedure, the Aircraft Vortex Spacing
System (AVOSS) [26], and the Wake
Vortex Warning System (WVWS).
An important first step towards
implementing an operational weather based
ATM concept to increase capacity, is the
definition of, and agreement on, weather
classes that allow evaluation of the wake
vortex induced risk under different
meteorological conditions.
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6 Conclusions
6.1 Safety assessment
This paper describes a novel probabilistic
WAke Vortex Induced Risk (WAVIR)
assessment methodology. It can be used as
a tool to evaluate separation minima for the
current practice and for promising new
ATM concepts that may enable a safe
reduction of the current separation minima.
The methodology incorporates:
• Wake vortex evolution model;
• Wake encounter model;
• Flight path evolution model;
• Risk criteria framework.
6.2 Single runway example
The methodology has been illustrated for a
B737 landing behind a B747-400 aircraft,
with expected separation distance equal to
4 Nm, 5Nm, and 6 Nm at the threshold.
The results clearly show the high potential
of the methodology towards risk based
policies for safe and appropriate separation
minima of existing and new ATM concepts
or procedures. However, key modelling
areas appeared that ask for increased
research before adequate understanding of
wake vortex safety can be reached.
Summarized, these areas are [29]:
General modelling areas:
• Navigation performance and long
landing models;
• Pilot reactions when experiencing a
slight roll upset;
• Bursting and linking phenomena.
Airport specific modelling areas:
• Weather, including impact of stable
stratification, wind shear, turbulence;
• Runway dependencies involving
combinations of wake vortex induced
risk and collision risk between aircraft
or with the ground.
Numerical results showed two areas along
the single runway approach path where the
risk can considerable:
• Near the threshold, due to rebound and
ground effect of the vortices;
• At distances further than about 10 km
from the threshold, due to larger
navigation errors further away.
These results are in line with statistical
analysis of data from e.g. the ETWIRL
wake encounter data base [28].
6.3 Some recommendations
In support of the development of new
inventive ATM concepts, a thorough wake
vortex safety assessment that identifies the
key safety bottlenecks should be carried
out. It is of major importance to incorporate
the view of pilots and controllers at an early
stage of the design and development of
such an ATM concept. It is equally
important that involved interest groups (a.o.
regulatory authorities, pilots, controllers,
safety analysts) agree upon a risk criteria
framework to be used within risk based
policy making.
6.4 Ongoing research
Apart from this single runway approach
illustration, which has been carried out
within NLR’s basic research programme,
also wake vortex induced risk related to the
newly proposed High Approach Landing
System (HALS) procedure at Frankfurt
airport has been evaluated under contract to
the Deutsche Flugsicherung (DFS). Since
January 2000, NLR is leading the major
three-year S-Wake project and is also
involved in the related C-Wake project,
both for the European Commission. Under
co-ordination of the Thematic Network
Wake Vortices (WakeNet), NLR is
collaborating with key European wake
vortex experts to further develop validated
tools for assessment of wake vortex safety,
and to define inventive solutions to cope
with the risks induced by wake vortices.
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